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THE JONES ACT:
IT IS TIME FOR REFORM
Richard L. Clarke 
Clemson University
The Jones Act was passed in 1920 as an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act. Its initial purpose 
was to protect a rail monopoly operating between the state of Washington and the territory of Alaska. 
It restricted transportation between U.S. ports to U.S. built, owned, registered and crewed vessels. 
Over the past 77 years it has become very controversial. This paper examines its costs and benefits 
and concludes that the Jones Act is indeed in need of major reform.
INTRODUCTION
The Jones Act of 1920 set aside domestic trade 
for US-built, US-flagged and U.S. crewed ships. 
The primary purpose of the Jones Act was to 
ensure the United States would have an 
adequate merchant marine fleet available 
during national emergencies. Over the past 77 
years there have been many significant changes 
affecting U.S. defense sealift needs and 
capabilities.
Today, there is serious debate in Washington as 
well as several state capitals regarding the 
current benefits and costs of the Jones Act. The 
two primary debate topics focus on the increased 
costs of goods in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and 
Puerto Rico and the current national defense 
benefits of the Jones Act. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine these two primary issues to 
determine if it is time to reform or eliminate the 
Jones Act. To address this central question the 
paper reviews the background of the Jones Act, 
then analyses the impact the Jones Act has had 
on military sealift capability and finally 
examines the economic effects of the Jones Act.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
According to Wood and Johnson (1996) cabotage 
is a set of laws which restrict commerce between 
a nation’s port to carriers of that nation. It is 
one of the primary ways in which a nation can 
protect domestic transportation industries.
Cabotage was officially established in the United 
States under the Jones Act of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920. Its beginning, however, can 
be traced back to the eighteenth century.
In the late 1700's, the government of the United 
States began protecting US coastal trade 
indirectly. Acts passed in 1789 and 1790 levied 
discriminatory duties and port tonnage taxes on 
foreign-built ships engaged in U.S. coastal 
trades. In 1817, these acts were replaced by 
legislation that preserved US coastal shipping 
for domestically-flagged ships only. As new 
trade routes were developed to U.S. possessions 
and territories such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, 
Alaska, and the Philippines, they were included 
under this rule. During World War II, U.S. 
cabotage restrictions were temporarily lifted as
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the merchant marine became fully engaged in 
wartime missions.
The major piece of legislation that formally 
stated the U.S. position on coastal trade 
protection was the Jones Act of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920. It stated in part:
That no merchandise shall be 
transported by water, or by land 
and water on penalty of 
forfeiture thereof, between points 
in the United States, included 
Districts, Territories, and 
possessions thereof embraced 
within the coastwise laws, either 
directly or via a foreign port, or 
for any part of the transportation, 
in any other vessel than a vessel 
built in and documented under 
the laws of the United States 
(Whitehurst, 1985).
Over the years, there have been some exceptions 
to the Jones Act. The Philippines and the Virgin 
Islands were both given exemptions. This 
became irrelevant for the Phillippines when they 
gained independence in 1946. However, the 
Virgin Islands exemption still stands today. The 
original exemptions allowed goods to be 
transported by foreign-flagged ships if that was 
necessary to ensure adequate shipping service. 
In 1936, an amendment to the Jones Act was 
passed which granted the U.S. Virgin Islands 
complete exemption from U.S. cabotage laws 
unless decided otherwise by the President of the 
United States.
Section 27 of the Jones Act provides for other 
exemptions. The primary one is that, “vessels of 
foreign registry may transport between US ports 
empty cargo vans, shipping tanks, or barges 
designed for carriage aboard ship and associated 
equipment used in the vessel’s foreign trade” 
(Whitehurst, 1985). Section 27 also provides for 
the transfer of goods from one non-self-propelled 
barge to another, in the contiguous states. In 
addition, ships built with construction 
differential subsidies are not allowed to compete 
in the coastal trades. Occasionally, waivers
have been granted when no Jones Act ship was 
available. These waivers have almost entirely 
been for the transport of crude oil from Alaska to 
the lower forty-eight states.
Although some argue that the Jones Act has 
been effective and continues to be necessary for 
our national defense, not everyone agrees. A 
coalition for Jones Act Reform has been formed 
in Washington, DC. This reform group proposes 
significant changes to this long-standing law. 
The next section reviews the impact of the Jones 
Act on American labor, ships, and shipbuilding 
relative to defense needs and economic 
soundness.
LABOR
Over the years, the protection provided by the 
Jones Act and earlier laws allowed the wages of 
the American sailors to rise much more rapidly 
than those of foreign crews. The effect of these 
high labor costs on jobs is one area under fire in 
the debate over Jones Act reform.
The Jones Act, according to industry analyst 
Alan Abrams, has helped save jobs for American 
workers in the shipping industry (1991). In 
1983, there were approximately 160,000 
workers in private US shipyards. Of those, 
10,000 workers could directly attribute their 
jobs to the protectionism provided by the Jones 
Act. Unfortunately, the jobs saved by the Jones 
Act may have cost others their jobs in the U.S. 
shipping industry. By the end of 1995 more 
than 60 US shipyards had been shut down 
eliminating an estimated 200,000 U.S. jobs. In 
addition, 40,000 merchant marines and 40,000 
U.S. longshoremen have lost their jobs, despite 
Jones Act “protection” (Collins, 1996). Today, 
there is a notable lack of US-flag, US-crewed 
vessels engaged in carrying U.S. trade. A large 
part of this is due to the enormous discrepancies 
in wages and working conditions between US 
ships and foreign-flag vessels registered in 
countries with fewer regulations. Vessels form 
countries like Bangladesh, the Philippines, and 
Eastern Europe have comparatively lower crew 
costs because they pay much lower wages and 
few, if any, benefits. A 1983 study conducted by
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the U.S. Congressional Budget Office found that 
U.S. crew costs were on average, 2.5 times 
higher than those of European crews and over 
six times higher than those of Third World 
Countries (Whitehurst, 1985). Primarily 
because of these very high crew costs, U.S. ship 
owners have increasingly registered their ships 
in so called flag of convenience nations like 
Panama, Liberia, Honduras and the Marshall 
Islands so they can use much cheaper foreign 
crews. In addition, the U.S. International Trade 
Commission recently concluded that the Jones 
Act has cost thousands of jobs across 
agriculture, metals, forestry, manufacturing and 
petroleum sectors of the U.S. economy (Collins, 
1996).
In testimony to the House subcommittee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure in June 1996, 
the President of the U.S. Steel Manufacturers 
Association, James Collins, argued for reform of 
the Jones Act. According to his testimony, the 
Jones Act restrictions are putting U.S. steel 
makers at a distinct disadvantage with respect 
to their foreign competitors who are free to use 
the full range of transportation options. 
Included in his testimony are the following 
specific examples:
♦ it’s more expensive to ship scrap metal from 
the Port of New York-New Jersey (NYNJ) to 
the U.S. Gulf Coast than it is to ship it from 
NY-NJ to any Asian port.
♦ Venezuela has become the leading supplier 
of steel products in Puerto Rico because of 
the excessively high cost of shipping steel 
under the Jones Act.
♦ Some U.S. steel producers can not ship to 
potential domestics markets at any price 
because the Jones Act ships are not available 
(1996).
SHIPS
The preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of 
1920 states in part:
That it is necessary for the national 
defense and for the proper growth of its 
foreign and domestic commerce that the 
United States shall have a merchant 
marine of the best equipped and most 
suitable types of vessels sufficient to 
carry the greater portion of its commerce 
and serve as a naval or military auxiliary 
in time of war or national emergency, 
ultimately to be owned and operated by 
citizens of the United States 
(Whitehurst, 1985)
The question that has been raised is whether or 
not the Jones Act has been effective in its goal of 
sustaining such a fleet.
Long-time maritime journalist Robert Quartel 
claims the Jones Act is actually responsible for 
driving most U.S. ships out of business. 
Although the U.S. has an extensive system of 
deep water and inland ports, it has almost no 
ships. While not a single coastal freighter 
operates on its nearly 2,000 mile-long East- 
Coast, thousands of coastal freighters ply the 
waters of Europe and the Pacific Rim (Quartel, 
1991). In 1830, American vessels carried 90 
percent of the nations’s trade; by 1980, they 
carried less than 10 percent and this number 
continues to decrease (Whitehurst, 1985). After 
World War II, there were approximately 2,500 
privately owned vessels of more than 100 tons 
displacement. According to the trade journal 
Feedstuff's, currently there are only 128 and of 
those, only 33 carry dry bulk cargo (1995). The 
rest are liquid carriers. There are no US-flag 
bulkers at all operating on the Great Lakes. 
The number of US-flag ships are declining and 
the military usefulness of the ones that remain 
are questionable.
In 1984, the Jones Act fleet included 198 active 
merchant vessels. However, according to 
Whitehurst, a senior transportation research 
fellow at the Strom Thurmond Institute,
In 1985 the US-flag merchant marine 
was only marginally capable of 
supporting US forces in Europe if war
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should come to that continent and could 
not simultaneously support a NATO 
effort and one or more contingencies in 
other parts of the world (1985).
This was evidenced in the Persian Gulf War in 
1991 where only 10 percent of the ships 
specifically subsidized for the national defense 
actually entered the war zone (Shorrock, 1993). 
In fact, the Jones Act had to be temporarily 
suspended during the Persian Gulf war because 
it was impeding the transportation of fuel 
products to the Gulf.
SHIPBUILDING
The preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of 
1920 also states that it is the policy of the 
United States to do whatever may be necessary 
to develop and ensure the maintenance of' 
citizen-owned and operated merchant marine. 
It is debatable whether the Jones Act has 
achieved its goal of being able to maintain this 
fleet and if this objective is being pursued in the 
most effective manner.
In the past, Jones Act ships have been 
responsible for keeping a number of U.S. 
shipyards from going out of business (Feedstuffs, 
1995). In the 30 years from 1953 to 1983, over 
300 vessels were constructed for the Jones Act 
trades (Whitehurst, 1985). From 1970 through 
1985, Jones Act ships accounted for 100% of the 
commercial ships built in American shipyards. 
This represents a notable investment in 
American shipping. The major justification for 
the extensive federal investment in U.S. 
shipyards has been to provide the construction 
and maintenance capability necessary to build, 
modify and maintain both naval warships and 
U.S. flag cargo ships. There’s little doubt this 
capability is essential to the foreign policy of the 
U.S. In 1984 and 1985, this investment totaled 
almost one billion dollars (Whitehurst, 1985). In 
the past, the Jones Act had a significant 
influence on keeping American shipyards alive 
and able to serve national defense needs. 
Military shipbuilding alone could not have 
accomplished this. However, as pointed out in 
the previous section, the Jones Act has not been
effective at stopping the significant decline in 
U.S. shipyard jobs or U.S. merchant seamen 
jobs. More recently, the Maritime Security Act 
of 1996 has eliminated an old requirement 
(dating from 1936) that ships receiving 
operating subsidies must be US-built.
While it is clear that shipyards must be 
maintained for the national defense, how many 
shipyards are actually needed and whether a 
sufficient defense base could be maintained 
without the Jones Act are questions now being 
debated. While Section 27 of the Jones Act 
granted a monopoly to the shipyards on 
construction of ships for domestic trade, it left 
construction for the international trade open to 
foreign competition. Since the cost of building a 
merchant ship in the U.S. is about three times 
that of building in Japan or Korea, domestic 
construction for foreign-trade merchant fleets 
has been virtually non-existent for the past 30 
years. However, the Alabama Shipyard (a 
subsidiary of Atlantic Marine Corporation) 
recently announced it will build four 1,432-TEU 
container ships in the U.S. for the China Ocean 
Shipping Co. It should be noted this exception 
was based on a 1994 rule change making Title 
XI loan guarantees from the U.S. Marine 
Administration available to non-U.S. companies 
(COSCO, 1997). Title XI of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 established government- 
backed loans to encourage U.S. companies to 
build their ships in U.S. shipyards just prior to 
the outbreak of WWII. This provision while 
initially very effective has not stimulated ship 
operators to build foreign-trade ships in U.S. 
shipyards for several years.
According to a report in the March issue of the 
American Shipper (1997), this $157 million deal 
was financed by a $138 million Title XI loan 
guarantee backed by the U.S. government. 
Whether this signals a long-term commitment to 
promote U.S. shipyards or a one-time political 
decision remains to be seen. The question 
remains then, if U.S. shipyards are unable to 
compete on the international market, are we 
taking the most effective or efficient route to 
maintaining our shipyards for national defense?
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THE COST OF THE JONES ACT TO 
AMERICAN CONSUMERS
The US Built Requirement
Since 1920, the Jones Act has greatly affected 
millions of American consumers and hundreds 
of American businesses. In 1990, the 
International Trade Commission studied the 
costs of the Jones Act to American consumers 
and found that the Act costs consumers an 
additional $10.4 billion per year (Quartel, 1991). 
This cost estimate is derived from the high 
prices that must be paid to transport goods on 
U.S. ships relative to the average prices paid for 
foreign-flag shipping. The Jones Act requires 
that the ships used in domestic trade be crewed 
by US citizens and be built in US shipyards. 
Many feel that the Jones Act is a barrier to 
competition and that U.S. Flag domestic carriers 
pay too much for vessels,
because they must operate in a restricted 
market with restricted resale capacity.
Today, the U.S. is 26th in the world in 
merchant shipbuilding, with a mere 0.2% 
of the world’s gross tonnage. Between 
1980 and 1987, despite the Jones Act’s so 
called protection, 60 US shipyards closed! 
The last order for a major Jones Act 
vessel was in 1987 for the R.J. Pfeiffer, 
built for Matson Navigation. The ship 
was estimated to cost over $150 million, 
or nearly 2.5 times the world price. (The 
Jones Act, 1996).
Supporter’s Views
There are some people who feel very differently 
about the Jones Act. An article entitled, 
“Dismantle the Jones Act”, by Joey Farrell 
(1991), President of American Waterway 
Operators, argues that the Jones Act provides 
the U.S. with working shipyards and crews to 
man their ships. The author believes the Jones 
Act’s survival is crucial to the survival of the 
U.S. economy. However, Farrell overlooks the 
cost issue and says that U.S. shipyard jobs are 
more important than the high consumer prices. 
He is not the only supporter of the Jones Act.
The maritime unions that man the ships and 
supply labor to the shipyards are also strong 
supporters of the act. Farrell feels that The 
Jones Act is the only U.S. maritime promotional 
statute that has worked. He feels that if we 
didn’t have the Act we would have foreign 
vessels crewed by foreign nationals taking over 
the domestic trade of the United States. 
However, opponents to the Act have proposed 
reforms that would help to preserve U.S. jobs 
and shipyards.
National Defense
Following the Persian Gulf War, the Clinton 
Administration studied the effectiveness of the 
Jones Act in providing ships for national 
defense. A commission headed by Vice- 
President Gore found that only 10% of the US- 
flag ships “specifically subsidized for the 
purposes of national defense” entered the war 
zone during the Persian Gulf war (Shorrock, 
1995). Quartel maintains that only one Jones 
Act ship was part of the Persian Gulf 
deployment, and it was a roll-on, roll-off vessel. 
He and many other respected maritime 
observers believe that the Jones Act fleet was 
simply not of the right type for use in the rapid 
sealift deployment required in Operation Desert 
Storm (Quartel, 1991). It seems clear that the 
main objective of the Jones Act is not being 
achieved. This certainly supports the view that 
the Jones Act is outdated and should be 
reformed.
Alaska and Hawaii
Alaska’s and Hawaii’s consumers must bear 
significantly higher costs for goods than their 
mainland counterparts as a result of the Jones 
Act.
Studies have estimated the cost of the 
Jones Act to Alaskans to range from 
$269 million to as high as $674 million 
per year. This equates to an annual 
penalty on every Alaskan household of 
between $1921 and $4821 (The Jones 
Act, 1996).
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These are very high costs that captive 
consumers must bear. Alaska and Hawaii have 
been fighting the Jones Act reform battle for 
years by trying to get a waiver to the Jones Act. 
The costs imposed on consumers in Alaska may 
be even higher than the above figures show. 
The Governor of Alaska reported that 
independent consultants have estimated the 
costs to Alaskans imposed by the Act to be as 
high as $800 million annually. It is evident 
that Alaska and Hawaii must pay higher costs 
because of the Jones Act. There is little doubt 
that consumer goods of all kinds would be 
cheaper in these states if shippers were free to 
use foreign-flag as well as US-flag vessels. This 
reason has led supporters of the Jones Act 
reform to form a special interest group called the 
Jones Act Reform coalition.
THE JONES ACT REFORM COALITION 
AND THE COASTAL SHIPPING 
COMPETITION ACT
The Jones Act Reform Coalition, according to its 
Internet web site (www.lexitech.com/jarc), is an 
860,000 member group of diverse private and 
public sector organizations. These organizations 
include chemical fertilizer and steel 
manufacturers, agriculture, livestock, and 
forestry companies, ports, independent vessel 
owners and operators as well as consumer and 
other advocacy groups. The president is the 
former maritime journalist, Robert Quartel.
The Coalition, founded in 1995, has been 
successful in lobbying Congress to introduce 
Jones Act reform legislation. The Bill, known as 
the Coastal Shipping Competition Act, would 
remove (among other things) the Jones Act 
restriction that U.S. deepwater domestic 
shipping (U.S. domestic coastal trade would be 
redefined to include all waters accessible by 
ocean-going vessels, including the Great Lakes 
and the St. Lawrence Seaway) be limited to 
U.S.-built, owned, flagged and crewed vessels 
(Martell, 1997).
Passage of this bill would significantly change 
the regulatory controls enacted 77 years ago and 
undoubtedly change the transportation industry.
It’s difficult to say what specific changes might 
occur, but there’s a strong chance U.S. coastal 
shipping would reemerge as a transportation 
industry segment and a competitor of rail 
transportation.
The Jones Act Reform Coalition predicts that 
this new legislation would improve U.S. national 
security by increasing the number of vessels and 
deepwater-qualified seamen available to the 
Department of Defense in time of national 
emergencies. The bill is currently being 
discussed in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it appears that 
the Jones Act has outlived its purpose. It’s 
contribution to military sealift is now minimal 
and it artificially inflates the cost of goods for 
millions of American consumers. The 77-year- 
old law protects very few U.S. flag carriers from 
foreign-flag competition while distorting 
domestic waterborne transportation markets. It 
has also undermined the world-wide 
competitiveness of some important U.S. 
industries, most notably the steel industry. In 
short, the overall negative impact the Jones Act 
continues to make on the U.S. economy appears 
to be much greater than the small benefits it 
may still provide. It is time to reform the Jones 
Act as Congress is currently considering.
For years, the U.S. Steel Manufacturers 
Association, Alaska, Hawaii, the Jones Act 
Reform Coalition, and many independent 
organizations have been fighting to gain enough 
support to reform the Act. There have been 
many concrete reform proposals. The proposed 
Coastal Shipping Competition Act would 
eliminate the U.S. ownership requirements in 
exchange for a requirement that foreign-flag 
ships conform with U.S. environmental 
regulations, immigration laws, and work force 
health and safety regulations. The Bill also 
would require foreign-flagged ships to be 
registered as U.S. corporations, and pay U.S. 
taxes.
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Supporters of the reform movement claim with 
reform would come more jobs for American 
merchant seamen because the amount of 
intracoastal shipping would increase if cheaper 
foreign-built ships were permitted to compete. 
They believe ships would start competing with 
trucking and rail and this would in turn reduce 
shipment costs and bolster the U.S. sealift 
mobility base. This assessment is based on a 
reform bill provision which requires domestic 
trade ships to be manned by Americans or green 
card holders. Of course, not everyone agrees 
with this scenario.
Several key congressmen, including Senate 
majority leader Lott, and Admiral Herberger, 
chief of the U.S. Maritime Administration,
believe U.S. national defense would be 
weakened if the Jones Act were reformed. While 
they don’t dispute the view that shipment costs 
would decrease, Senator Lott and Admiral 
Herberger believe U.S. seafaring jobs would be 
lost to foreign-flag shipping.
The debate now being waged in Congress seems 
to focus on the issue of the value of the Jones 
Act to U.S. national defense. While it is 
understandable that military officials would 
rather have complete control of all resources 
that might be needed in a national emergency, 
the facts suggest there is a more cost effective 
way to accomplish this purpose. It is time to 
reform the Jones Act by enacting the Coastal 
Shipping Competition Bill.
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